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Abstract: Antidumping actions in the United States and EU are known
to be linked to macroeconomic conditions. In part, this is because
positive injury findings may be easier to make in a downturn. We
explore the evidence for Mexico, one of the main “new” antidumping
using countries. Injury determination is also critical in Mexico’s
antidumping policy, as a majority of unsuccessful complaints have been
rejected because of negative injury findings rather than negative findings
of dumping. Working with data from 1987 through 2000, we provide
evidence for a relationship between macro-economic factors and
antidumping complaints, including current account and exchange rate
movements, and both local and global general macroeconomic
conditions.
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11. Introduction
The pressure for import protection often increases during macroeconomic
downturns or periods of exchange-rate appreciation. For example, Leidy
(1997) finds that the number of antidumping and countervailing duty (i.e.
subsidy remedy) complaints in the USA increases with the unemployment
rate and decreases with the rate of industrial capacity utilization. A positive
relationship between the number of complaints and the real value of the
dollar is also found. Feinberg (1989) also links antidumping actions to
movements in exchange rates. In a more recent study covering the USA,
the EU, Australia and Canada, Knetter and Prusa (2000) establish that both
a real currency appreciation and a fall in real GDP growth lead to an
increase in antidumping complaints.
While the demand for import protection is linked to macroeconomic
conditions, there is also evidence that the supply of administered
protection (primarily antidumping duties) is also a function of the business
cycle. An explanation offered by both Feinberg and Leidy is that the actual
supply of protection under antidumping rules is not really related to
dumping by foreign firms, but rather to the ability to show injury suffered
by domestic industries. In the USA, for example, negative injury
determinations are the main reason why complaints are unsuccessful, while
positive findings of dumping margins are more frequent. Domestic
industries may thus perceive that there is a greater chance of success during
macroeconomic downturns and exchange-rate appreciations, since they are
more likely to be suffering injury in these conditions (independently of
whether this injury really is fully or partially caused by dumping).
In recent years (and especially since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
of GATT negotiations in 1993), there has been a rapid spread of
administered protection regimes to almost all low- and middle-income
developing countries. (See Miranda et al, 1998, and Zanardi, 2002). Yet, the
empirical literature in this area remains focused on the track record of the
traditional antidumping regimes: the U.S., EU, Canada, and Australia. We
extend the literature by exploring the relationship between macroeconomic
factors and antidumping complaints in one of the most important new
regimes, the one in Mexico.
2We have organized the paper as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
the antidumping regime in Mexico, (based on the database detailed in
Section 3). As in the USA, the majority (close to 80%) of unsuccessful
complaints in Mexico have been rejected because of a negative injury
finding rather than a negative dumping finding. In Section 3 we work with
data from 1987 through 2000. We find evidence for a relationship between
macro-economic factors and antidumping complaints, including exchange
rate movements, and for a linkage with both local and global general
macroeconomic conditions.
2. Antidumping in Mexico
National antidumping laws must be consistent with WTO/GATT rules.
Mexico adopted its antidumping law in 1986, the year it joined the GATT.
The antidumping rules were originally laid out in the Unfair Trade
Practices Regulations 1986, and enforced by the Ministry of Trade and
Industry (now the Ministry of the Economy). In 1993, the legal framework
was modified. The antidumping rules were included in the Foreign
Commerce Law, published in July 1993, and further set out in the Foreign
Commerce Law Regulations, published in December 1993. The Unidad de
Prácticas Comerciales Internacionales (International Trade Practices Unit)
was created as a special division within the Ministry of the Economy to
undertake investigations under the antidumping rules (as well as under the
CVD and safeguard rules).1
In the period spanning from the beginning of 1987 to the end of 2000, the
Mexican antidumping authority undertook a total of 172 investigations.
Considering all cases in which a final decision was published, the overall
“success rate”—ie, the proportion of investigations resulting in duties or
undertakings—was 67.4%. This is much higher than the average success
rate of all antidumping investigations world-wide between 1987 and 1997,
which was 47.1%. (See Miranda et al, 1998.) Thus, Mexico appears to have
applied the antidumping rules more aggressively than other regimes.
                                                 
1 For a more comprehensive description of the legal framework of antidumping in
Mexico, see Leycegui (1995).
3Figure 1 shows the distribution of the levels of antidumping duty imposed
by the Mexican authority. It only refers to the 69 cases resulting in an ad
valorem duty, the first of which was only imposed in May 1992. Before that
date—and in some cases since then—only per-unit or weight-based duties
were imposed. As elsewhere, antidumping duties in Mexico are generally
very high. The modal duty is between 21% and 40%. Leaving out China,
the unweighted average duty is 50%.2 As can be seen from Figure 1, China
stands out from the other countries because it is subject to particularly high
duties, mostly exceeding 100%, and in one case as amazingly high as
1,105%.3 The unweighted average antidumping duty for China is 253%.
Just how high these duties are is evident from a comparison with Mexico’s
“normal” import tariffs. The unweighted average of Mexico’s most-
favored-nation (MFN) import tariff is 17%, while the modal MFN tariff is
13%.4 Normal import tariffs are even lower than MFN for the countries
with which Mexico has a preferential trade agreement (which include the
USA and Canada in NAFTA, various Central and South American
countries and the EU). In particular, the complete abolishment of import
tariffs within 15 years under NAFTA—where the majority of Mexico’s
imports come from—is already well underway, bringing antidumping
duties further out of line with prevailing import tariffs.
[Figure 1 about here]
On a regional basis, North America (i.e., the USA and Canada) was the
most frequently targeted region under the antidumping law, accounting for
                                                 
2 According to Hindley and Messerlin (1996, p. 29), the average dumping duty is
roughly 20%–25% in the EU and 30%–35% in the USA, although Blonigen and
Prusa (2001, p. 23) report an average duty in the USA of about 60% over the past
decade.
3 This last case concerned footwear and parts thereof from China, exported to
Mexico by companies such as Reebok and Nike. The investigation was opened in
April 1993 and finalised in December 1993. The “fair” value was determined as
the export price to third countries (Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand).
4 These figures are based on information provided by the Ministry of the
Economy. In 2000, Mexico had ad valorem MFN import tariffs on 11,079 eight-
digit tariff items, which is 97% of all tariff items (the remainder either had a per-
unit tariff or a hybrid). These tariffs range between 3% and 260%, with the
unweighted average being 17% and the modal 13%.
434.3% of all investigations, followed by East Asia (26.7%), Latin America
(17.4%), the EU and its member states (9.9%) and Eastern Europe and the
former USSR (8.7%). Of these regions, the EU and East Asia suffered a
higher than average success rate (82.4% and 73.9%, respectively), while
only Latin America experienced a distinctly below-average success rate
(53.3%). Compared to each region’s share in total Mexican imports over
the period, North America is under-represented as an antidumping target
(34.3% of antidumping investigations versus 74.4% of imports), while
Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe and the former USSR are
over-represented.
As to individual target countries, Mexico has initiated antidumping
investigations against 33 different countries (including the EU, which
sometimes is targeted as a whole). The five most frequently targeted
countries are the USA (55 investigations, or 32.0%), China (26
investigations), Brazil (19) South Korea (9) and Venezuela (6). Of these,
China suffered a clearly above-average success rate (84.6%), while South
Korea experienced a below-average success rate (44.4%). The USA’s share
in antidumping investigations is much smaller than its share in total
Mexican imports in the same period (72.5%), while the reverse is true for
the other major targets.
Table 1 shows that the steel industry is by far the most important
complainant in antidumping investigations in Mexico. Steel and steel
products account for 30.2% of all investigations, and had a very high
success rate of 82.7%. The chemical industry is another regular
complainant, representing 22.7% of the investigations. Other important
industries are textiles, plastics, electrical equipment and processed food.
This sectoral distribution in fact makes Mexico a quite typical antidumping
user as it is similar to the distribution of antidumping investigations world-
wide. (See Miranda, 1998).
[Tables 1,2 about here]
Table 2 shows how frequently the Mexican antidumping authority used
each of three methodologies to determine the “fair” value of the imports
5under investigation. It should be noted that information on the
methodology used has not been published in 25 cases. In addition, in a
number of cases more than one methodology was used (for example, for
different exporting firms covered in the same investigation). The home-
price methodology, which under the WTO rules should be applied in the
first instance, is used in almost half of the investigations. The constructed-
value methodology is used in 25% of cases, and the third-country-export
methodology in 16%.
3. Empirics
3.1 Data Overview
We have constructed a database of antidumping investigations in Mexico
for 1987-2000.5 The relevant variables for the present exercise are
summarized in Table 3. The database builds heavily on one developed by
the Directorate General for Economic Studies of the Mexican Federal
Competition Commission, called SIAM.6 SIAM summarizes the
information on all antidumping and CVD decisions published by the
antidumping authority in the Mexican Official Journal between January 1987
and December 2000. For a typical investigation, the authority publishes
three different decisions, announcing, respectively, the initiation of the
investigation, the preliminary duties (if any), and the final outcome. SIAM
puts the different decisions referring to the same investigation together
under one “action”. These actions can then be accessed, for example, by
product, by tariff class or by country.
In organizing our data we have used a number of specific definitions and
criteria to classify antidumping investigations. Because these criteria are to
some extent subjective, the total number of investigations in our dataset
may differ from those given by other sources, such as the WTO or the
Mexican antidumping authority itself. This is mainly for four reasons. First,
only antidumping investigations are considered in the analysis. The
                                                 
5 These data are available on request, and can be downloaded from
www.intereconomics.com/francois.
6 SIAM stands for Sistema de Información sobre Acciones antidumping y
antisubvenciones de México (Information System on Antidumping and CVD
Actions in Mexico).
6(relatively few) CVD investigations in Mexico are omitted. Second, where
an investigation involves multiple target countries, each country is counted
as a separate investigation. The same approach might in principle have
been taken where an investigation involves multiple products. After all,
competitive conditions—and hence the outcome of the dumping margin
and injury assessment—may vary significantly between products. However,
this is not practical, since, first, a product is not an unambiguously
delineated concept, and second, some investigations cover literally
hundreds of different products that happen to be in the same broad tariff
class. Thus, an investigation involving one target country but related
multiple products counts as one. Third, cases covering multiple exporters
from the same target country are treated as a single investigation. This is
also for practical reasons, since many investigations cover all exporters
from the target country. Fourth, only cases where an official investigation
has actually been opened, and a final decision published, are taken into
account. This excludes the several instances where the antidumping
authority has rejected a complaint for not fulfilling certain requirements,
for example, the representativeness of the complainants (also known as
“standing”). It also excludes the few instances where the investigation was
closed before a final decision was reached, for example, because no
imports of the product in question were found to have taken place during
the investigated period, or because the complainants withdrew.7
3.2 Specification
In the empirical exercise that follows, the number of investigations
initiated (CASES)  is the dependent variable. Because the Mexican
antidumping regime has only existed since 1986, and the first investigations
were not initiated until 1987, we use biannual rather than annual figures.
This doubles the total number of observations for the dependent variable
to 28. (See Figure 2). Given standard investigation timetables, it is
reasonable to assume that firms can file a complaint, and the authorities
can initiate the investigation, within six months after the explanatory
                                                 
7 The withdrawal of a complaint once the investigation is ongoing seems to be a
much more common phenomenon in the USA. See Prusa (1992). In Mexico, such
early withdrawals have been rare.
7variables have an impact (and lagged effects of explanatory variables can be
included in the analysis at any rate).
[Figure 2 about here]
Formally, our regressions take the form:
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where t = 1 (1987-1),…, 28 (2000-2); c is a constant term; and 1 £ y £ t.
The other variables are discussed below and in Table 3.
To estimate the currency effect, the real exchange rate of the Mexican peso
(RER), as reported by the Mexican Central Bank (Banco de México, 2001),
is taken as explanatory variable. This exchange rate is reported monthly in
index form, and is a trade-weighted average of the exchange rate of the
peso with respect to 111 countries, adjusted for consumer price inflation.
These figures are averaged into a six-monthly index. An increase in the
index value means an appreciation of the peso and vice versa.
Mexico’s total current account balance is an alternative measure of trade
conditions which might explain the number of antidumping complaints.
Political pressure for trade protection is likely to increase with the size of
the current account deficit.8 This variable (CAB) is also sourced from
Banco de México (2001)—which reports the current account balance on a
monthly basis in dollar terms—and re-expressed in six-monthly index
form. As expected, the CAB variable is highly (negatively) correlated with
the RER variable—the correlation coefficient is –0.84. Therefore, below
the two variables are analyzed separately.
                                                 
8 Throughout most of the period considered, Mexico has sustained a current
account deficit. The only semesters with a surplus are 1987-1, 1987-2, 1988-1 and
1996-1.
8To estimate the effect of overall macro-economic activity, an index of total
domestic manufacturing output (MANPROD) is taken as explanatory
variable. After all, antidumping law only covers trade in goods, and
domestic manufacturing output seems the most accurate indicator of how
those potentially affected by dumping (domestic manufacturers) are faring
overall.9 The index is based on the same monthly publication of indices by
Banco de México.
In addition, following the studies of Feinberg, Leidy, and Knetter and
Prusa, an index of macro-economic activity world-wide (WORLDMAN) is
considered as a further explanatory variable. This is to control for the fact
that downturns in other countries may cause firms from those countries to
dump by selling below average total cost. The index has been compiled
from world manufacturing output indices taken from various issues of the
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics published by the UN Statistics Division. It turns
out that the WORLDMAN  and MANPROD  variables are highly
correlated—the correlation coefficient is 0.97, suggesting that Mexican
domestic manufacturing output is closely related to global manufacturing
activity. For this reason the variables are analyzed separately below.
A number of additional explanatory variables have been modeled. First, the
lagged number of investigations is considered in order to capture the
“depletion effect” (ie, a high number of complaints in one period may
“deplete” the stock of potential complaints in the following period).10
Several combinations of cumulative lags have been tried, given that the
depletion effect may be cumulative over a certain timeframe. It turns out
that the sum of the number of investigations in the periods t–1 and t–2 (ie,
the 12 months before the period of the start of the investigation) has the
most significant impact. Only this lagged variable is reported below.
Second, several combinations of the lagged values of RER , C A B,
MANPROD and WORLDMAN have been included to test whether
complaints are caused by trade and macro-economic factors in previous
periods. However, it turns out that these lagged effects are insignificant
and the results are therefore not reported below. With respect to lagged
values, Knetter and Prusa (2000, p. 19) observe that:
                                                 
9 GDP was tested as an alternative indicator of macroeconomic activity, but did
not lead to more significant results.
9While not specified under WTO rules, all of the reporting countries generally
analyze pricing behavior over the year prior to the filing of the case in order to
assess LTFV [less than fair value]. By contrast, all of the reporting countries
evaluate injury over a longer time horizon. In general, injury is determined over
the three years preceding the filing. Given these features of the law, it seems
plausible to consider lags from one to three years for our variables.
However, while the time periods these authors refer to may be relevant for
the outcome of investigations, it is not so clear why they should influence
the number of complaints. For the present analysis, only lags of one and
two periods have been considered (ie, up to one year), and even these turn
out to have insignificant effects, as mentioned above.
Third, the model includes a dummy (DUM94/1) that takes the value of 1
from the first semester of 1994 onwards. This is to control for the sharp
fall in number of investigations after 1993. This marks the coming into
force of the Foreign Commerce Law and its Regulations in July 1993 and
December 1993, respectively. These set out clearer requirements and
procedures for the filing of antidumping complaints, and may thus have
had an impact on the number of accepted complaints.
[Table 3 about here]
3.3 Results
Tables 4 and 5 report OLS results for various models of CASES. Table 4
shows the results for six different model specifications in levels. Table 5
shows the results for two model specifications where the dependent and
explanatory variables are expressed in logarithms.11
[Tables 4 and 5 about here]
                                                                                                                      
10 This term has been borrowed from Leidy (1997, p. 137), who finds such an
effect in the USA.
10
From the results in both Tables, each of the macro-economic variables
considered has a statistically significant relationship with the number of
antidumping investigations initiated. In particular,
• In each specification where it is included, the coefficient of RER lies
within the 99% confidence interval. The positive sign of the
coefficient means that, as expected, the number of complaints
increases when the real exchange rate appreciates.
• The CAB variable, which is tested as an alternative to RER, also has
a statistically significant coefficient (at the 1% level in specification
(5) and at the 5% level in specification (6)). It has the expected
negative sign, indication that a worsening of the current account
balance leads to a higher number of antidumping complaints.
• The MANPROD  and WORLDMAN variables, representing
domestic and global manufacturing output, respectively, have a
statistically significant negative relationship with the number of
antidumping cases (at the 1% level in most specifications; at 5% in
the others).12 Thus, pressure for antidumping protection does indeed
increase in macro-economic downturns.
Table 5 also shows that there is some evidence of a depletion effect. In
specifications (2) to (4) the number of antidumping investigations in the
two lagged periods has a statistically significant impact on the number of
investigations in the following period. The coefficient has the expected
negative sign. However, in specification (1) the coefficient is only
significant at the 10% level, while in specifications (5) and (6), and in Table
5, it is insignificant.
Finally, the dummy variable for 1994-1, which is only included in
specifications (1) and (2), turns out to be insignificant. This suggests that
the sharp fall in the number of antidumping complaints after 1993 can be
                                                                                                                      
11 Table 5 does not assess the current account variable (CAB). This variable has
negative values for many periods so that the logarithm cannot be used.
12 The finding that global output has a significant impact is consistent with
Knetter and Prusa (2000) but not with Leidy (1997).
11
sufficiently explained by the other macro-economic factors and the
depletion effect.
4. Summary
Mexico is a clear example of an emerging economy that has embraced
trade openness, but that at the same time has become a heavy user of
antidumping. In this paper, we explore macroeconomic linkages to
antidumping investigations. Our data shows that pressure for protection
under the antidumping law are influenced by macro-economic factors,
including both the business cycle and current account conditions.
Specifically, the number of antidumping complaints increases when the real
exchange rate appreciates or the current account deficit widens, and when
growth in manufacturing output slows down. Given the structure of
antidumping law, both factors raise the probability that domestic industries
will be found to be suffering injury, regardless of whether imports are
actually dumped or not.
12
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Table 1:
Mexican antidumping investigations and success rate by complaining
industry (1987–2000)
Target Number of
investigations
Share of
investigations
Success rate
Steel and steel products 52 30.2% 82.7%
Chemicals 39 22.7% 64.1%
Textiles and textile products 17 9.9% 47.1%
Plastics and plastic products 12 7.0% 58.3%
Electrical equipment 9 5.2% 55.6%
Processed food 9 5.2% 66.7%
Machinery and non-electrical
equipment
8 4.7% 62.5%
Wood and paper products 5 2.9% 40.0%
Rubber and rubber products 5 2.9% 80.0%
Other manufactures 10 5.8% 60.0%
Miscellaneous1 6 3.5% 83.3%
Total 172 100% 67.4%
Note: 1 Includes non-metallic minerals, ceramics, cement and leather products.
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Table 2:
Methodologies used in Mexico to determine the “fair” value (1987–2000)
“Fair” value
methodology
Number of
investigations2
Share of
investigations2
Success rate
Home price 83 47.7% 66.3%
Export price to third
country
28 16.3% 60.7%
Constructed value 43 25.0% 76.7%
Unknown1 25 15.1% 64.0%
Total 172 100% 67.7%
Note: 1 Unknown means no information on methodology used was given in the decision as
published in the Official Journal. 2 Totals do not sum to 172 or 100% since in a number of
cases two different methodologies were used.
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Table 3:
Description of the variables included in the linear regression model
Variable Description Data source Expected
sign
Dependent variable
CASES Number of investigations initiated
in semester. Linear variable with
mean of 6.1 and standard deviation
of 7.1.
Own database built from
various issues of the Diario
Oficial de la Federación.
n.a.
Explanatory variables
CASES(t–1)+CASES(t–2) Number of investigations initiated
in previous two semesters
(capturing depletion effect). Linear
variable with mean of 13.0 and
standard deviation of 11.7.
Own database built from
several issues of the Diario
Oficial.
–
RER Trade-weighted average real
exchange rate of peso with respect
to 111 currencies. Linear index
variable with 1987-1=100, mean
152.9 and standard deviation 28.5.
Banco de México, Indicadores
Económicos y Financieros
(www.banxico.org.mx).
+
CAB Average current account balance in
period. Linear index variable with
1987-1=100, mean –201.7 and
standard deviation 174.3.
Banco de México, Indicadores
Económicos y Financieros
(www.banxico.org.mx).
–
MANPROD Total domestic manufacturing
output (in volume terms). Linear
index variable with 1987-1=100,
mean 137.3 and standard deviation
25.5.
Banco de México, Indicadores
Económicos y Financieros
(www.banxico.org.mx).
–
WORLDMAN World manufacturing production.
Linear index variable with 1987-
1=100, mean 121.9 and standard
deviation 15.4.
United Nations, Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics, various
issues.
–
DUM94/1 Dummy variable with value 0 until
1993-2 and 1 from 1994-1, to
capture effect of new antidumping
rules which came into force at the
end of 1993.
n.a. –
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Table 4:
OLS regression analysis with number of antidumping investigations
initiated biannually (CASES) as dependent variable
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 5.47
(0.57)
50.4
(2.31)**
2.73
(0.71)
28.7
(2.86)***
25.3
(2.63)**
36.2
(2.78)**
CASES(t–1)+CASES(t–2) –0.40
(–1.90)*
–0.51
(–2.45)**
–0.34
(–2.35)**
–0.33
(–2.46)**
–0.28
(–1.50)
–0.26
(–1.46)
RER 0.42
(3.06)***
0.39
(3.83)***
0.37
(4.50)***
0.30
(4.54)***
CAB –0.04
(–2.79)***
–0.03
(–2.67)**
MANPROD –0.44
(–2.28)**
–0.36
(–4.36)***
–0.17
(–2.47)**
WORLDMAN –0.82
(–2.88)***
–0.53
(–4.66)***
–0.27
(–2.65)**
DUM94/1 2.25
(0.43)
6.09
(1.17)
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.24 0.27
ARCH LM test F-
statistic
0.37 0.13. 0.35 0.09 0.27 0.23
Note: OLS regression with 26 included observations. Estimated coefficients are shown with t-
statistics in parenthesis. *** means coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1% level; **
means significant at 5% level; * means significant at 10% level (using two-tailed test). The ARCH
LM test is performed to test for autocorrelation in regressions with lagged dependent variables. The
test uses two lagged residuals. The F-statistic in each case shows that the null hypothesis (errors are
serially uncorrelated) cannot be rejected.
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Table 5:
OLS regressions with number of antidumping investigations initiated
biannually (CASES) as dependent variable—values in logarithms
Explanatory variable (1) (2)
Constant –0.98
(–0.22)
14.2
(2.17)**
Log{CASES(t–1)+CASES(t–2) –0.38
(–1.28)
–0.44
(–1.60)
Log(RER) 5.87
(3.77)***
4.76
(4.10)***
Log(MANPROD) –5.33
(–3.38)***
Log(WORLDMAN) –7.42
(–3.90)***
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.51
ARCH LM test F-statistic 1.06 1.37
Note: OLS regression with 25 included observations. Estimated coefficients are shown with t-
statistics in parenthesis. *** means coefficient is significantly different from zero at 1% level; **
means significant at 5% level; * means significant at 10% level (using two-tailed test). The ARCH
LM test is performed to test for autocorrelation in regressions with lagged dependent variables. The
test uses two lagged residuals. The F-statistic in each case shows that the null hypothesis (errors are
serially uncorrelated) cannot be rejected.
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Figure 1:
Frequency of different levels of ad valorem antidumping duties imposed by
Mexican antidumping authority (number of cases, 1987–2000)
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Figure 2:
Number of antidumping investigations initiated in Mexico per semester
(1987–1 to 2000–2)
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